Analysis from Ed Felten on AACS, the next generation DVD DRM technology. AACS does what the CSS (the current standard) tried to do, but does it "correctly," and will sufficiently limit the ability to build and distribute a DVD player (or DVD playing software) without signing a contract with the DVD-CCA.

What it won't do is prevent DVD piracy. As before, if the pirate wishes to make a copy of a DVD on DVD media identical to the original, he does not have to decrypt anything, he just copies the complete encrypted set of data. But if he wishes to decrypt the data for some other form of redistribution (i.e. a form without DRM), he only has to reverse engineer an existing player to do so. With AACS, the DVD-CCA could deter widespread use of the results of that reverse engineering by blacklisting the compromised player's Device ID for all new DVDs being printed (by printers contractually bound to the DVD-CCA to honor the blacklist). But only a seller of non-compliant DVD players would need to make widespread use of a compromised key; a pirate does not need to publicize which keys he used to benefit from the results.